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Introduction
On 29 December 1953, the newsroom of Popular Cinema (Dazhong dianying 大衆電影) in Beijing held a New Year gala for Chinese translators and dubbing artists of foreign films and their audience. 
Among the guests were dubbing artists Che Xuan 車軒, Wu Jing 吳靜, and 
Bai Jingsheng 白景晟, who dubbed, respectively, for the characters of Yakov 
Sverdlov (in M. Itina and Sergei Yutkevich’s Yakov Sverdlov, 1940, translated 
into Chinese in 1951), Zoya Kosmodemyanskaya (in Lev Arnshtam’s 1944 
film Zoya, translated in 1950), and Joseph Stalin (in Mikheil Chiaureli’s 
Unforgettable Year 1919, 1951, translated in 1952). The audience applauded 
wildly and “connected the heroic figures with the dubbing artists right 
away”: “It was the first time they met, but the audience was very familiar 
with their voices.” Representatives from the audience claimed that the 
Soviet heroes’ devotion to the Communist Revolution inspired them to work 
hard on their own revolutionary projects, and the Soviet brothers’ well-
developed techniques kindled their passion to “create and invent” for the 
construction of a new socialist China. For the audience, the dubbing actors’ 
work was essential for their connection with the Soviet big brothers: “If 
they speak Russian, we could never understand them. We are so grateful 
to you for speaking the revolutionary mentors’ words in Chinese (…).” The 
celebration did not end until midnight (Bu 1954: 24-5).
This meeting shows that on the one hand, dubbed Soviet films were highly 
influential cultural products in the 1950s, which, according to the Chinese 
Communist Party, allowed ordinary Chinese people to know, get close to, and 
be inspired by the image of their Soviet heroes. In the 1950s, the People’s 
Republic of China dubbed more than 300 Soviet films into Chinese in order 
to “enhance [its] relationship with the Soviet people”: to promote pro-
Soviet Cold War foreign policy, to reinforce Sino-Soviet friendship among 
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the people, and to cultivate a worldview of a shared destiny and common 
future within the Socialist camp (Zhang 1957: 116). These films covered a 
variety of genres, including historical epic, war film, comedy, biopic, children’s 
film, etc., and most of them showed Soviet people’s struggle against fascism 
and imperialism, heroes devoting their lives to socialist revolution and 
construction projects, and a tomorrow of modernisation and abundance 
promised by socialism. They fostered the feeling of internationalism by 
revealing to the Chinese that the Soviets shared the same “progressive 
values,” experience of “revolutionary struggle,” and a future of prosperity with 
them (Chen 2004: 89). On the other hand, this meeting also demonstrated 
that this friendship-building mission could not be accomplished without the 
dubbing actors’ work. The words or lessons of the “Soviet big brothers” had 
to be mediated by the Chinese language and Chinese voices to be understood 
and accepted by the Chinese audience. This paper focuses on the translation 
and dubbing of Soviet filmic characters and asks: how did the government’s 
goal of forging a sense of intimacy with the Soviets and the illusion of a 
homogeneous Socialist culture within the Eastern Bloc shape the practices of 
translators and dubbing actors? How in turn did these practices legitimise and 
negotiate with the idea of the Sino-Soviet alliance?  
The use of dubbed Soviet films to cultivate pro-Soviet sentiment was part 
of the national campaign of Sino-Soviet friendship around 1949. On 30 June 
1949, on the eve of the establishment of the PRC, Mao Zedong announced 
the “Leaning to One Side” (yibiandao 一邊倒) policy, signifying clearly that 
China was taking the side of the Soviet Union in the Cold War. However, 
when this foreign policy was put into effect, government officials soon 
realised that the idea of a Sino-Soviet alliance was not supported by ordinary 
Chinese people. Reports show that around 1949, anti-Soviet sentiment was 
not uncommon among Chinese citizens. Traumatised by the long history 
of Russian invasion of China, many Chinese considered Soviets enemies or 
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strangers rather than friends.1 Thus, the government saw an urgent need to 
cultivate a sense of closeness and friendship towards the Soviet people so as 
to support the government’s pro-Soviet stance.
Literature on the Sino-Soviet relationship has long concentrated on 
political, diplomatic, military, and economic cooperation and conflicts 
(see, for example, Westad 1998; Lukin 2003; Heinzig 2004; Lüthi 2008; 
Radchenko 2009). These works, though telling stories about leaders and 
high-ranking officials in policymaking on the national level, rarely address 
the lower-level and grassroots dimensions of this relationship, such as the 
propaganda projects that connected the policies to the ordinary people, 
with little attention paid to cultural exchanges between the two socialist 
superpowers. After the millennium, more scholars started to focus on the 
cultural aspects of Sino-Soviet interactions (See Bernstein and Li 2009; 
Yu 2015; Volland 2017; Li 2018). Their works highlight grassroots society’s 
role in the international relationship, take cultural exchanges as a crucial 
dimension of the Sino-Soviet alliance, and challenge the common perception 
that the Mao era was culturally isolated from the world. Among the Soviet 
cultural products introduced into China were dubbed Soviet films, which, 
while playing a significant part in cultural diplomacy and in shaping Chinese 
people’s reception of their Soviet big brothers, still remain understudied.2 
Engaging with the few scholars who have touched upon this topic, I explore 
how the government used dubbed Soviet films to reach and influence the 
Chinese masses. I present these films as an important part of the CCP’s 
project of winning Chinese “hearts and minds” for the Soviet allies and 
highlight the complexities within this project.
This paper also brings a new emphasis on the practices and politics of 
translating and dubbing. Recently, scholars have begun to pay attention to 
the importation, exhibition, and reception of foreign films in the PRC (Chen 
2004; Huang 2013; Chen 2014; Du 2018). However, these studies largely 
ignore the nuanced translating and dubbing practices, as well as the Chinese 
filmmakers’ agency in speaking for the foreign other.3 My study will look at 
these translating and dubbing processes, and present the heteroglossia within 
them, with a focus on the content of the dialogue, as well as the techniques, 
aesthetics, and politics of voicing. I adopt a broad definition of translation, 
which includes communication of meaning not only in written texts but also 
in verbal forms, and I argue that dubbing is essentially one major form of 
translation. To make the discussion clearer, I use “translation/translating” and 
“dub/dubbing” to specify the procedures of dialogue translation and voice 
performance during the process of making dubbed films. I borrow theoretical 
tools from both Translation Studies and Cinema Sound Studies to discuss 
two major questions: did translating and dubbing domesticise or foreignize 
the image of the Soviets? What impact did the phenomenon of “Soviet 
characters speaking Chinese” have on Chinese people’s perception of the 
Soviets? 
Using a wide range of materials including contemporary newspapers, film 
journals, government archives, autobiographies, oral histories, and interviews 
with translators/dubbing actors/spectators, and listening to the dubbing 
voices closely, I explore how the official rhetoric of Sino-Soviet friendship 
shaped Chinese filmmakers’ translating and dubbing practices, and how the 
dubbed films contributed to, challenged, or deconstructed their own mission. 
I show that the dubbed Soviet films as well as dubbing practices were coded 
to support and cultivate Sino-Soviet friendship among the Chinese audience 
during the 1950s. Although designed by the PRC to produce an image of 
relatable and familiar foreigners as friends and comrades, these films also 
produced an image of strangers, which allowed an alternative imagination of 
the Soviet people as foreign among the Chinese audience. Overall, this paper 
argues for treating the image of the “Soviet big brothers” as ambiguous in 
dubbed films in the 1950s – an image that disrupted the official rhetoric of 
the Sino-Soviet friendship, and thus of China’s relationship with the world.
The rise of dubbing
To delineate the rise of dubbed Soviet films and its importance to the Cold 
War propaganda of the Sino-Soviet alliance in the PRC, a brief prehistory 
of dubbing, or how the Chinese watched foreign films and especially Soviet 
films before 1949, is helpful. When film was first introduced into China at 
the end of the nineteenth century, Chinese people watched these “Western 
shadow plays” with the help of live interpreters and playbooks. As early as 
the 1920s, film companies started to experiment with showing foreign films 
with Chinese subtitles, which became a major approach of film translation 
through the 1930s. Later on, Chinese theatres introduced simultaneous 
interpretation into the audience’s experience of watching foreign sound 
films – with a set of earphones called yiyifeng 譯意風, the audience listened 
to the narrated dialogues and storyline in Chinese while watching the films. 
Dubbing practices only appeared in the latter half of the 1940s in Shanghai, 
when Richard Thorpe’s 1942 film Tarzan’s New York Adventure was released 
in 1946 and Mario Camerini’s 1940 drama A Romantic Adventure was 
exhibited in 1947. These films became forerunners for the PRC’s dubbed 
foreign films, which started in 1949 with the Soviet classic Private Alexander 
Matrosov (1947) (Jin 2018: 197-8; Du 2018: 10-5). 
The above narrative, focusing on Hollywood and other Western cinema 
shown for entertainment in big cities such as Shanghai, by no means covers 
the whole story of the screening of foreign films in Republican China. In fact, 
Soviet films had been shown in China since the 1920s, and the history of 
showing and translating these films before 1949 is of greater interest to my 
study here. The first exhibitions of Soviet films – a series of documentaries 
on Lenin’s funeral – took place in 1924 in Shanghai and Tianjin (Cheng 1957: 
77). During WWII, more Soviet films, including Lenin in October (1937) and 
Chapaev (1934), were screened in Yan’an. These films were accompanied 
by a simultaneous translator, who usually had studied in the Soviet Union 
(Shi 2015: 108). Not until 1946, when the Soviet Union established the 
delegation bureau of Sovexportfilm in Harbin, were Soviet films shown in 
China on a large scale. Most of the Soviet films shown by the Sovexportfilm 
in China were subtitled, and by 1948, the Sovexportfilm had shown several 
hundred Soviet films in this way in Northeastern China. Around 1948, 
Sovexportfilm also produced dubbed films: the first dubbed Soviet films were 
Zoya and Symphony of Life (1948), which were dubbed by Chinese students 
in Moscow “with a funny mixture of dialects from throughout China” (Meng 
2003). 
With the establishment of the PRC, for the first time in Chinese history, 
dubbing became the prevailing form of film translation. To produce dubbed 
films, the new regime built a series of translation and dubbing institutions, 
including the Dubbing Office of the Northeast Film Studio (Dongbei dianying 
zhipianchang fanbanzu 東北電影製片廠翻版組) and the Shanghai Film 
1. For a more detailed study of the Chinese perception of the Soviets around 1949, see Hess (2007).
2. An exception is Tina Mai Chen’s paper on Soviet films’ circulation and reception in China, which is 
the first to discuss the role of these films in Maoist China.
3. In one chapter of her dissertation, Weijia Du discusses the impact of dubbing as opposed to 
subtitling on Chinese audiences from 1949 to 1994. Her work reveals the general nature of dubbing 
in the PRC, but there is still the need for a closer look at the first days of dubbing in China – how 
dubbing practices were shaped by the historical context and how they influenced the audience’s 
perception of the more specific political messages (Du 2018: 84-112).
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Dubbing Studio (Shanghai dianying yizhipian chang 上海電影譯製片廠).4 
These studios recruited and trained teams of dubbing actors and actresses 
who could voice all kinds of characters in foreign films, and they primarily 
translated and dubbed films from the Soviet Union, at least during the early 
days. For the first three years, almost all the films these studios dubbed were 
from the Soviet Union. And for the entire 1950s, dubbed Soviet films made 
up more than half of their total production. 
Why dubbing? What made dubbing a good choice for the PRC when 
it decided to introduce Soviet films to the Chinese audience on a large 
scale? Here I associate the rise of dubbing as the prevailing method of film 
translation with the PRC’s foreign policy agenda towards the Sino-Soviet 
alliance. First, dubbing Soviet films allowed them to be understandable and 
approachable to the broadest possible Chinese audience, making dubbing 
the most logical choice for film translation. Filmmakers at the Northeast 
Studio claimed that before 1949, with the help of subtitles, playbooks, and 
interpreters, people in Northeast China could generally grasp the story of 
Soviet films, but “still felt difficulties” in understanding the meaning of the 
films (Liu and Meng 1952: 17). If we further take into consideration the 
low literacy rate in China in 1949, it is clear that the first and foremost 
reason for the CCP’s choice of dubbing was that it allowed most Chinese to 
understand the films, which was crucial for any kind of further understanding 
or imagination of the friendship between the Chinese and the Soviets. 
Second, compared to the subtitled Soviet films shown in China during 
the Republican era, dubbing guaranteed the accuracy and authority of 
the Soviet lesson to the Chinese. As Meng Guangjun 孟廣鈞, a translator 
at the Sovexportfilm and then the Northeast Studio, recalls, the early 
subtitles were crude. They were printed on a strip of film and projected on 
a separated screen below the regular screen; the subtitle image was divided 
into 4 frames, each of which contained 18 Chinese characters; a subtitle 
projectionist would manually change the subtitles projected. The translations 
were far from accurate, presumably because of the word limit, and they 
only served to convey the general idea of the dialogue (Meng 2003; Wang 
2014: Kindle Locations 374-6). This flawed form of film translation did not 
meet the CCP’s expectation for the translation of Soviet films, which were 
hailed by Liu Shaoqi 劉少奇, the Vice Chairman of the Central Government, 
as an expressway to “knowing and learning from the Soviets,” and a tool for 
“enhancing the Sino-Soviet friendship” (Committee of Art in Film Bureau 
of the Ministry of Culture 1950: 9). In contrast, with the foreign characters 
speaking Chinese, dubbing promised a more accurate understanding of the 
Soviet characters. If we consider the hierarchy within the friendship – the 
Soviet Union being the teacher and the “big brother” – it is not hard to 
imagine that the PRC would welcome dubbing, which not only delivered 
the words of the Soviets with more accuracy but further enhanced the 
audience’s understanding of the Soviet characters.
Third, dubbing facilitated Chinese audience’s identification with the 
Soviet characters by allowing the viewer/listener to imitate and repeat the 
speech of the Soviet characters. A scene described by Liu Zhiguang 劉志廣, 
a streetcar mechanic from Beijing, is a good example. According to Liu, the 
dubbed Soviet films, especially Zoya, How the Steel Was Tempered (1942), 
and Private Alexander Matrosov, deeply impressed him and other workers, 
and he oftentimes heard his colleagues at work reciting Pavel Korchagin’s 
famous line, “Man’s dearest possession is life, and it is given to him to live 
but once…” (Bu 1954: 25). Liu’s example shows a unique way of perceiving 
Soviet films in the 1950s, which included not only listening to the lines of 
the Soviet characters, but also remembering, repeating, and imitating them. 
On the one hand, the process of reciting changes the workers’ relationship 
with revolutionary voices: the young workers listened to and remembered 
the voices of the Soviet big brothers, and further became voicers of the 
revolutionary messages themselves. They no longer passively listened to the 
voices but internalised and repeated them: as soon as they started to recite 
these words, they became a supporter and participant in the revolution. 
On the other hand, this process of reciting also changed the workers’ 
relationship with the Soviet heroes on the screen. By chanting the same 
words as Pavel, or even imitating the emotions and tones of the character, 
the young workers in Beijing stood with the Soviet hero and joined the 
shared mission of fighting for the “finest cause in all the world – (…) the 
liberation of mankind.” The dubbing performance made the lines recitable 
and imitable to a mass audience, changed the audience’s way of interacting 
with the film, and encouraged the workers’ transnational identification. 
“Now they are not only understandable, but also 
feel extremely intimate.” 
As I have shown, the PRC’s Cold War foreign policy of “leaning to one 
side” motivated not only the film translation project but also the choice of 
dubbing as the major method of film translation. This mission of cultivating 
transnational identification was not limited to the choice of dubbing or the 
organisation of dubbing institutions, but permeated the theories and methods 
of translating and dubbing practices. Turning to the filmmakers’ practices of 
translating and dubbing for these Soviet films, I demonstrate in this section 
how the CCP expected the dubbed Soviet films, with their domesticated words, 
voices, and emotions, to produce the image of an understandable Soviet ally 
for the Chinese mass audience so as to facilitate transnational identification. I 
also reflect on this expectation with a brief view of theories on dubbing. 
In the CCP’s expectations for dubbed foreign films, domestication of the 
image of the foreigners was a major concern. As early as 1950, the central 
propagandists from the Committee of Art in the Film Bureau of the Ministry 
of Culture published their review of the film-dubbing project, in which they 
highlighted “Sinicization of translated films” as the first major issue to tackle. 
“The translated Soviet films are for the Chinese audience,” the committee 
claimed, “so they should be Sinicized to a certain extent – although we also 
need to consider the original flavour” (Committee of Art in Film Bureau 
of the Ministry of Culture 1950: 9). This review highlights the strategy of 
domestication in making dubbed Soviet films in socialist China and its 
significance in constructing transnational identification. 
First and foremost, officials in the Ministry of Culture believed that the 
medium of dubbed cinema encouraged the Chinese audience to feel close 
and intimate with the Soviet characters as well as the Soviet world depicted 
in the films because the Soviets speak Chinese: “In the past, the audience 
could not understand many of the Soviet films,” the report goes; “now they 
not only understand, but also feel extremely intimate” (Committee of Art 
in Film Bureau of the Ministry of Culture 1950: 9). Because the Soviet allies 
spoke the target language on screen, which fundamentally domesticised the 
foreign film, the Chinese audience, according to the central propagandists’ 
design, felt close to Soviet characters and identified them as their “big 
brothers.”
4. The Dubbing Office of the Northeast Film Studio was built in 1949, as an affiliated office of the 
Northeast Film Studio. The Northeast Film Studio was renamed the Changchun Film Studio in 
1955. Similarly, the Shanghai Film Dubbing Studio was first established as a translation group in 
the Shanghai Film Studio, which was created on 16 November 1949. In 1957, the group became 
independent from the Shanghai Film Studio and was named the Shanghai Film Dubbing Studio, 
showing the rising importance of dubbed films in Chinese cinematic industry.
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The process of dialogue translation also shortened the distance between 
the Chinese audience and the dubbed Soviet films as well as their Soviet 
characters, although assimilating cultural foreignness into Chinese culture 
was not without consideration for the “original flavour.” To make the lines 
easy to understand for the Chinese, the propagandists from the Ministry of 
Culture commanded the filmmakers to avoid word-for-word translation of 
Russian idioms but to find a Chinese saying equivalent in meaning – they 
should use paraphrases instead of metaphrases. Here is a salient example: 
when translating the exclamation“О, мой бог (Oh, my god),” instead of 
the literal translation of “哦,我的上帝 (o, wode shangdi, oh, my god),” which 
is unfamiliar to mainstream Chinese culture, translators used “天啊 (tian’a, 
Heaven).” The Ministry of Culture approved of the latter translation because 
while both “tian’a” and “О, мой бог ” were “expressions of superstitious 
emotion,” the “tian’a” translation would make the Chinese audience feel more 
familiar and thus “intimate” because it was Chinese slang (Committee of Art 
in Film Bureau of the Ministry of Culture 1950: 9). With the domesticating 
translation, dubbed Soviet films produced the image of the Soviets as easily 
understandable and more familiar to the Chinese audience.  
The dubbing actors’ vocal performance was also expected to be 
domesticating. During the 1950s, a crucial concern for dubbing artists was 
how to accurately represent the Soviet characters through their voices. Their 
performance had to “match” or synchronise with the original images in the 
Soviet films. Not only should the dubbing actors’ voices match the lips of 
the Soviet characters, but the emotions in the voices should correspond 
to those of the characters. Interestingly, when the dubbing actors worried 
about whether they could adequately understand these foreign heroic 
figures’ thoughts and emotions, they oftentimes looked to their own life 
experiences, observations of people in everyday life, and even stories and 
reports of Chinese heroes of the time. For example, when dubbing Dream of a 
Cossack (1951), actor Liu Qun 劉群 not only read books about Soviet farms, 
but also “stories about Chinese heroes,” and “researched the psychological 
activities of a lot of our old peasants” (Bu 1954: 25). What transpired in Liu’s 
vocal performance was a domestication of emotions of the foreign film 
characters. Articles describing such stories as Liu’s were regularly published in 
propagandist film magazines, signifying an officially-approved way of dubbing 
(Zhang 1957: 117; Xinru 1954: 26). By imbuing the foreign characters with 
emotions developed from Chinese local experiences, the dubbing practices 
reduced the characters’ foreignness and brought a familiarised image of the 
Soviet allies to the Chinese audience.
The Chinese propagandists’ expectation of the dubbed Soviet films in 
many ways resonates with Abe Mark Nornes’s theory on dubbing, which 
highlights domestication as “built into the standard conventions of dubbing” 
(Nornes 2007: 220). To Nornes, the medium of dubbing is fundamentally 
domesticating, since “the foreign language is completely extracted, replaced 
with sameness” (ibid.: 219). Furthermore, Nornes mentions the possible 
effect of dubbing in constructing transnational character identification, which 
is brought by the very phenomenon of “the foreigners speaking the target 
language.” He quotes Harada Masato, the dialogue translator and director 
of Japanese dubbings of a series of American films, who claimed that when 
he watched his own dubbing in Full Metal Jacket (1987), he was “so moved” 
precisely because the character was speaking Japanese:
If it is subbed, the people on the screen are really foreign because they 
look different and speak a language you can’t understand. There’s 
a built-in distance. But with dubbing it’s close. They are white, but 
when Cowboy dies at the end, it was like a friend died because he was 
speaking Japanese. I want Japanese to feel that kind of pain, but they 
won’t if it’s subtitled. It’s simply not the same. (Nornes 2007: 220)
Harada’s experience allows a way to imagine the connections between the 
audience and the dubbed characters: with the foreign characters speaking the 
target language, the audience might feel close to them. However, Nornes’s 
theory, with its emphasis on domestication, might tell only one side of 
the story. Emotional intimacy is not the only possible audience reception; 
dubbing can also potentially cause resistance among the audience for the 
irreconcilable image-voice split. There are other critical theories of voice 
and dubbing in cinema that can provide useful tools to complicate our 
understanding of the experience of watching dubbed foreign films and help 
us better understand the role dubbing played in the dubbed Soviet films. 
As argued by most scholars of Cinema Sound Studies, since the birth of the 
sound film, there has been a gap between the image and the voice. The screen 
does not talk – the voices spectators perceive are not from the visible mouths 
on the screen, but from the speaker of the sound system in the cinema. As 
Michel Chion comments, the physical nature of film necessarily “makes an 
incision or cut between the body and the voice” (Chion 1999: 125). The 
sound film thus is always dualistic, and is always trapped in the image-voice 
split. To overcome this split and make the spectators believe that the voice 
comes from the actor on the screen, or in other words, to achieve audio-
visual realism, sound films must try to match the moving image with the 
voice. Rick Altman has famously compared the sound film to ventriloquism in 
that it conceals the true source of voice (the loudspeakers, usually behind the 
screen) and matches the lips and other bodily movements with the voice. In 
this way, sound film fosters “the pseudo-identification of the sound source” 
and restores the “naturalness” of the character on screen (Altman 1980: 77). 
Combining synchronism and synthesis, Michel Chion comes up with the 
notion of synchresis, the “weld” produced “between a particular auditory 
phenomenon and visual phenomenon when they occur at the same time” 
(Chion 1990: 63). Chion claims that this “weld” is spontaneous and irresistible, 
and he highlights it as the apparatus with which the sound film sutures the 
voice back to the body.
With the actors on screen speaking a foreign language, dubbing makes 
the image-voice split noticeable and tangible. This split, to Chion, can also be 
covered with synchresis, and he insists that it is possible for the audience to 
believe the character on the screen speak another language. However, it is 
important to note that synchresis in dubbed foreign films does not always 
or promptly succeed in naturalising the target-language-speaking foreigners. 
In his formulation of the image-voice relationship in dubbed films, Mikhail 
Yampolsky highlights the peculiar or alienating effect this image-voice gap 
creates. Reading Jorge Luis Borges’ 1945 essay on dubbing, Yampolsky notices 
the moment when Borges compares dubbing to Chimera, the Greek hybrid 
monster composed of parts from multiple animals. Yampolsky describes 
dubbed films as creating a Chimera, because by showing an actor on the 
screen with a voice that he cannot make, these films combine different bodies 
together. He uses Jacques Lacan’s concept of object a for his formulation of 
dubbing. To Lacan, voice is a kind of object a, which is something separable 
yet related to the subject. As object a falls out and gets separated from the 
body, it leaves a lack, a void or cavity in the latter. Desire then originates from 
the cavity, circles around object a and draws it back to the body, to store up 
the lack and restore its unity. Yampolsky shows that the dubbing voice, on the 
one hand, creates the illusion of being spoken by the body and belonging to 
the body; on the other, as an alien voice, distorted and foreign, it “loses the 
quality of object a and does not create (…) a bodily hiatus” (Yampolsky 1993: 
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76). Thus, the dubbing voice can never return to or regain unity with the body, 
and the Chimera is split and “riddled with cracks” (ibid.). This consequence 
creates a schizophonic effect, which, for Antonella Sisto, causes “psychic 
resistance in the filmic reception,” and “alienation from the moving/sounding 
images” (Sisto 2014: 9). Yampolsky’s theory allows us to see the possibility of 
a disconnect between image and dubbed voice and complicates the image-
voice relationship in dubbed films. If the phenomenon of “foreigners speaking 
the target language” to Abe Mark Nornes and Harata Masato enhances the 
audience’s affinity for the foreign characters, Yampolsky’s theory warns us this 
identification is never that easy. 
The Chinese audience’s reception also shows that the propagandists’ plan 
for the dubbed Soviet films was not realised without challenges or difficulties. 
Watching foreigners speaking Chinese was a new experience to most Chinese 
audiences of the late 1940s and early 1950s. Articles explaining how the 
Soviets could speak Chinese appeared in film magazines from the first days of 
dubbed Soviet films in China. In his 1950 article “How can the Soviets speak 
Chinese,” Chen Xuyi 陳叙一, leader of the Shanghai Studio, noticed that 
after watching dubbed Soviet films, many people felt surprised: “They say 
these are all Soviet films, but why do the foreigners all speak Beijing dialect?” 
(Chen 1950: 5). This is the moment when the Chinese spectators recognised 
the Chimerical body of the dubbed Soviet character, which became split 
and peculiar, and likely created resistance among the spectators rather than 
identification. It would be difficult to imagine the spectators feeling intimate 
with these distorted characters, not to mention being able to learn political 
lessons from them. This kind of article continued until 1954, suggesting that 
it took years to train the Chinese people to become the ideal audience for 
these dubbed films, and that at least in the early 1950s, the Chinese-speaking 
Soviets were viewed as a spectacle, a Chimera, to some audiences (Yao 1953: 
296; Che 1954: 32). With the Soviet characters turning into a monstrous 
being, the CCP’s expected reception of these films is likely to have been 
disrupted. 
Production of the strangers
Because of this disruption, the effect of the domesticating strategy in 
translating and dubbing Soviet films can be questioned. Though the films 
were translated and dubbed under the central propagandists’ expectation 
of producing familiar foreign friends, the Chinese-speaking Soviet characters 
nonetheless disrupted this perception. Further, as I show in this section, the 
translators and dubbing actors also showed their agency in the making of 
dubbed Soviet films. I highlight the foreignization practices and effects in the 
translation and dubbing process and show that domestication is never the 
only or even the most important characteristic of translated Soviet films. With 
the foreignization of translation and voice performance, the dubbed Soviet 
films also produced strangers – foreigners who were difficult to assimilate 
into Chinese culture, whose foreignness was preserved, and whose existence 
further disrupted the official imagination of the Sino-Soviet friendship.
On the level of dialogue translation, domesticating translation was never 
the only method for Chinese filmmakers. Although the propagandists in 
the central government promoted Sinicization in translation, they did not 
deny its limitations: Sinicization should be done only if it did not change the 
“original meaning” of the lines. Nor did they offer an absolute or hard-and-
fast rule of translation (Committee of Art in the Film Bureau of the Ministry 
of Culture 1950: 9). There was relative freedom for the translators to translate 
the dialogues according to their own imagination of how the foreign allies 
should sound in Chinese. Many of them claimed that the first and foremost 
principle of their translation was “loyalty to the original,” and the first 
generation of filmmakers in the Shanghai Dubbing Studio were known for 
avoiding over-domesticating foreign films (Pan 2017: Kindle Location 551). As 
commented by Su Xiu 蘇秀, a dubbing actress since 1950 and a director for 
dubbed foreign films since 1954 in the Shanghai Studio, she made a special 
effort to avoid the use of Chinese proverbs in foreign films (ibid.). Sense-to-
sense translation never truly ruled the dubbed Soviet films, and with more 
foreignness in the dialogue preserved, the image of the foreigners became 
more complicated.
A good example of this is from Dream of a Cossack. When translating 
this film, the Changchun Studio encountered a Russian proverb “ Своя 
рубашка ближе к телу” (“his shirt is closer to the body”), which signifies 
the character’s concern for his own benefits and happiness. The translator 
Liu Chi 劉遲 and dozens of his colleagues spent a great deal of time on this 
sentence. They tried old Chinese sayings such as “姐倆出門, 個人顧個人” 
(jielia chumen, geren gu geren, two sisters go out the door, each takes care of 
herself) and “爹死娘改嫁, 個人顧個人” (die si niang gaijia, geren gu geren, 
father dies and mother remarries, everyone only takes care of himself). But 
finally the filmmakers chose to use an almost word-for-word translation “自
己的襯衫最貼身” (ziji de chenshan zui tieshen, his own shirt is the closest), 
which did not exist in Chinese and did not sound as local as the first two 
options. The translator himself wrote an article saying they were not sure 
whether this translation would be understandable to the Chinese audience: “I 
don’t know whether the audience, after watching the film, could understand 
this sentence as we do” (Liu 1952: 19). At the risk of not being immediately 
understandable to the audience through literal translation, the filmmakers 
were able to preserve the foreignness in the dialogue and maintain the 
unfamiliar image of the foreigners to the audience. 
In the dubbing process, the filmmakers also purposefully foreignized 
the Soviet characters. Since the first dubbed Soviet film Private Alexander 
Matrosov, an important method was changing the pronunciation of 
characters’ names. The dubbing actors changed the tones, accents, and 
rhythms of the translated names to assert their foreignness. Take Alexander 
Matrosov as an example. Translated as 亞曆克山大馬特洛索夫, it is 
pronounced as “yà lì kè shān dà mǎ tè luò suǒ fū” in Mandarin, with the 
characters separated from each other, with no accent, and with each 
character having its own tone. However, in the film, it is pronounced closer 
to the original Russian way, with a tone similar to the original and each 
character closer to each other. Another example is the name Stalin. In 
Chinese, it is pronounced “sī dà lín:” every syllable of this name is clearly 
separated, and each of the characters has its own tone. However, in dubbed 
Soviet films like Lenin in October, “si” and “lin” lost their own tone, and 
the name is pronounced with a rising tone on “da,” which is similar to the 
original pronunciation. This method of pronouncing foreign characters’ 
names in a way different from the Chinese suggested to the audience that 
these characters on the screen, although speaking the same language as the 
peasants and workers, were never really members of “us.” 
Therefore, by their active foreignization of the translated Soviet films, 
Chinese filmmakers called foreignness into the films and allowed the 
audience to view the Soviet characters as a foreign other. Further exploration 
of audience reception confirms the effect of these translating and 
dubbing practices. The first kind of audience response that challenges the 
propagandists’ expectation of an image of the “intimate” and understandable 
foreigners involves misunderstanding. According to many reports, the Chinese 
audience constantly complained that they could hardly understand the 
theme of many Soviet film, that they felt it hard to follow the stories, and 
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that sometimes they could not even tell one character from the other (Anon 
1954: 36).5 What is of interest to this study is that often this problem of 
misunderstanding was related to the foreignizing practices of the translators 
and dubbing actors. On the level of translation, the literal translation seems 
to be hard to follow for the audience. A critic complained that the language 
was not “pure Chinese,” and that many translated sentences did not 
sound grammatically correct, so “the audience could never understand the 
dialogue” (Jiang 1954: 14). On the level of dubbing, the foreignizing way of 
pronouncing Soviet names also caused problems. “Even though the audience 
made great efforts [to follow the translation],” the critic claims, “they still 
could not understand it” (ibid.: 14-5). Failing to understand the characters 
or follow the stories, the audience might view the Soviets as ridiculous 
strangers and the dubbed films as nonsense.
Another kind of audience response came from those who valued the 
filmmakers’ effort in foreignizing the films. A representative example is an 
article by Chen Danqing 陳丹青, who stated that the voice of the dubbing 
actors, especially the voice of Qiu Yuefeng 邱嶽峰, a famous actor at the 
Shanghai Studio, was purely foreign to the Chinese, “more foreign than the 
foreigners”:
In China, the official discourse could not be delivered by him: can you 
imagine Qiu reading communist editorial articles, reporting news, 
telling the stories of model workers? The voices of the radio reporters 
were also top-class; they spoke with the force of justice, but you could 
only hear the stylised tones with absolutely no personality or temper. 
Qiu is a strange “alien,” an Other to the national radio. He can only dub 
for the foreigners, outside the snares of China’s public voices. We, the 
millions of listeners of the public radio, could not listen to any different 
tones if it was not from him: tender, elegant, sluggish, lingering, cunning, 
cynical, impertinent. He overcame the plot and the characters – yes, 
thinking about it now, what we greedily listened to and enthusiastically 
craved was the aura of the language and the voices: that is the human 
emotion and the human nature. (Chen 2003: 112)6
The foreignness, according to Chen, was from the comparison between 
Qiu’s voice and the highly stylised Chinese national voices, the voices of the 
radio reporters. Qiu and other dubbing actors or actresses’ voices became 
“alien” and strange, because they did not fit into the stylised and over-
politicised soundscape of socialist China. With this alienated, defamiliarized 
voice, some of the Chinese audience acquired a way of imagining the 
foreigners and their foreign culture as something different from the Chinese 
people and culture and entrusted the other and the “there” with a meaning 
that they could not find “here.” The foreigners were finally strangers; 
although speaking Chinese, they could not be understood as one of “us” 
by the Chinese people, and many Chinese watched and listened to them 
precisely because they were different.
In these films introduced to reinforce Sino-Soviet friendship, there were 
foreigners who were misunderstood, and foreigners who were alienated 
because of their incompatible difference with the Chinese soundscape. These 
audience responses point to the foreigners as strangers, and the transcultural 
practices of translating and dubbing foreign films allowed a space of freedom 
for the audience. They could imagine the world in a different way from the 
“friendship of the people,” ponder possibilities other than the here and now, 
and even negotiate with or betray the revolutionary narrative. 
Conclusion
As my investigation shows, what the dubbed Soviet films created was never 
a clear image of the “big brother.” On the one hand, the official propagandists, 
promoting the Sino-Soviet alliance, expected the translators and the dubbing 
artists to produce an image of the Soviets as friends and comrades. On 
the other hand, these films also produced images of strangers who were 
different and incomprehensible. These different perceptions contributed to 
the ambiguous image of the Soviets in the Chinese audience’s daily lives and 
disrupted ordinary people’s imagination of Sino-Soviet friendship. 
This ambiguity does not mean the CCP’s project of winning hearts for the 
Soviet allies was a total failure, nor do I have any intention of denying the 
propagandist agenda’s power over the minds of translators, dubbing actors, 
and spectators. The translators did use local sayings such as “tian’a” (Heaven) 
instead of “o, wode shangdi” (Oh, my god) in dialogues, and articles 
explaining why the Soviets spoke Chinese in these dubbed films disappeared 
after 1954 – several years of screening dubbed Soviet films seemed to 
have trained the Chinese people into the ideal audience for these films, an 
audience that did not feel surprised when foreigners spoke Chinese. What 
this paper tries to say is that while the official voices remained strong in the 
1950s, the translators and dubbing actors still retained a certain agency in 
interpreting and representing the Soviets in an alternative way. And their 
works opened more possibilities for how the audience could imagine their 
Soviet older brother. With the dubbed voices, these films were never a simple 
instrument, but instead they complicated the way that people thought and 
felt about their foreign allies. 
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5. For more materials regarding the general issue of misunderstanding foreign films, see Du (2018); 
Liu Dishan (2015).
6. Translation is mine. Chen was born in 1953 and he claimed that he started watching foreign films 
at a very young age, and half of the movies he mentioned in his article were from late 1950s and 
early 1960s. Thus, his comments can be used to explore the reception of the foreign films around 
1960.
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